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ESSAY 
Reverse Advisory Opinions 
Neal Devins† & Saikrishna B. Prakash†† 
Federal courts have increasingly issued demands and requests for legal ad-
vice from the executive branch and other parties. Without offering any justification, 
federal judges simply assume that they may seek legal advice from virtually any-
one. These practices warrant further scrutiny. First, we believe that the federal 
courts lack the power to compel judicial advice, from parties to a case or otherwise. 
To begin with, the federal courts cannot demand opinions of Congress or the presi-
dent, for Article III never grants any such power. Indeed, such a power would be 
inconsistent with the independence and equality that each branch enjoys. Nor can 
courts compel parties to supply legal arguments because such a power is incon-
sistent with the autonomy that parties enjoy in litigation. Courts can no more de-
mand that parties address particular legal questions than they can demand that 
parties file suits. Second, with respect to nonparties, the federal courts generally 
lack authority even to request legal opinions. The Supreme Court’s practice of call-
ing for the views of the solicitor general is as unjustified as it is long-lived. The 
lack of justification is crucial, for current practice suggests no limits. Courts might 
request the advice of law professors or the National Rifle Association; they might 
even poll former solicitors general of the United States about what the law is. We 
believe this power to request legal advice is alien to Article III’s adversarial system 
and is instead a feature of civil law systems and congressional committees, where 
the inquisitors have much more latitude. The only time the federal courts may re-
quest legal advice from nonparties is when a party refuses to address a legal ques-
tion deemed relevant by the court and the court asks a nonparty to provide an ad-
versarial argument. 
INTRODUCTION 
A federal court recently handed out a “homework assignment” 
to the Attorney General of the United States.1 The assignment 
 
 † Goodrich Professor of Law, Cabell Research Professor of Law, Professor of Gov-
ernment, William & Mary Law School.  
 †† David Lurton Massee Jr Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
 We would like to thank William & Mary reference librarian Fred Dingledy, the ref-
desk at the University of Virginia Law Library, and our research assistant Seth Meyer 
for their help. Thanks also to Amanda Frost, Brianne Gorod, Greg Reilly, and especially 
Tara Grove for useful conversations about this project. Professor Prakash also thanks 
the University of Virginia summer research support program. 
 860  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:859 
   
raises fundamental questions about the powers of the federal 
courts, their relationship with the political branches, and their 
power to demand or request legal advice. In April 2012, the Fifth 
Circuit “directed” the Department of Justice (DOJ) to explain 
whether the Obama administration endorsed judicial review.2 
The order followed in the wake of President Barack Obama’s 
claim that it would be an “unprecedented, extraordinary” step 
for “unelected” judges to invalidate the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.3 The court ordered Attorney General Eric 
Holder to draft a letter spelling out the Department’s stance to-
ward judicial review. The letter had to discuss the President’s 
remarks, essentially ordering the Attorney General to repudiate 
or endorse them.4 Finally, the Fifth Circuit decreed that the let-
ter was to be “no less than three pages, single spaced,” and filed 
within forty-eight hours.5 
The Fifth Circuit’s order might seem extraordinary, but it is 
part of an emerging pattern. Almost a year earlier, in July 2011, 
the Ninth Circuit ordered the parties before it, including the 
DOJ, to each file a brief addressing whether the implementation 
of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 20106 meant that the 
pending case challenging the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell7 statute was 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Matt Negrin, Eric Holder Completes ‘Obamacare’ Homework Assignment; 
Criticism of Obama Supreme Court Comments Persists, The Note (ABC News Apr 5, 
2012), online at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/eric-holder-completes 
-obamacare-homework-assignment-criticism-of-obama-supreme-court-comments-persists 
(visited May 13, 2013). See also Matt Negrin, Holder to Respond to Judge on Obama’s 
Health Law Remarks, The Note (ABC News Apr 4, 2012), online at http://abcnews.go 
.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/holder-to-respond-to-judge-on-obamas-health-law-remarks 
(visited May 13, 2013). 
 2 Order, Physician Hospitals of America v Sebelius, No 11-40631, *1 (5th Cir filed 
Apr 3, 2012), online at http://amicuscuriousdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/oral 
-argument-letter.pdf (visited on May 13, 2013) (“Sebelius Order”); Attorney General Eric 
H. Holder Jr, Letter to Judge Jerry E. Smith, Judge Emilio M. Garza, and Judge Leslie 
H. Southwick, Physician Hospitals of America v. Sebelius, No. 11-40631 1 (5th Cir filed 
Apr 5, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 1130205). 
 3 Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010); White House Office of the Press Secre-
tary, Press Release, Joint Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderon of 
Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada (Apr 2, 2012), online at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/02/joint-press-conference-president 
-obama-president-calderon-mexico-and-pri (visited May 13, 2013). 
 4 Oral Argument, Physician Hospitals of America v Sebelius, No 11-40631, 
00:18:00 (5th Cir Apr 3, 2012), online at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ 
OralArgumentRecordings.aspx (visited May 13, 2013). 
 5 Id; Sebelius Order at *1 (cited in note 2). 
 6 Pub L No 111-321, 124 Stat 3515 (2010), codified at 10 USC § 654. 
 7 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 § 571 (“Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell”), Pub L No 103-160, 107 Stat 1547, 1670–73 (1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 124 Stat 3515. 
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or would be moot.8 This order was less overbearing than the 
Fifth Circuit’s order: briefs had to be filed in 10 days and could 
be up to 10 pages or 2,800 words.9 
Without question, the practice of federal courts, including 
the US Supreme Court, either ordering or requesting the DOJ to 
provide legal advice is on the rise. The Supreme Court increas-
ingly calls for the views of the solicitor general on whether the 
Court should grant certiorari in cases in which the government 
is not a party.10 On other occasions, the Court solicits a merits 
brief from the solicitor general.11 
The extent to which courts can demand or request the legal 
opinions of the executive and others is an uncharted area, one 
ripe for scholarly consideration. In this Essay, we begin that 
long-overdue exploration. 
We do not believe that the federal courts can demand legal 
opinions of anyone, parties to a case included. To begin with, we 
do not believe that federal courts can demand the legal opinions 
of the other branches, treating them as glorified law clerks. 
Courts have no more power to command the other branches to 
supply legal advice than the other branches have to demand the 
same of the courts. This conclusion arises from the absence of 
authority under Article III to order such opinions and from the 
damage it would do to the Constitution’s system of independent 
and coequal branches. Furthermore, we reject the notion that 
courts can force parties to a case to advance legal arguments or 
supply legal advice. Binding demands for legal advice would be 
inconsistent with the litigation autonomy that parties enjoy and 
that Article III presumes. Any such power would suggest a judi-
cial power not only to compel parties to reveal their weakest 
points but also to advance the best legal arguments for the other 
party. Article III does not permit the courts to demand of parties 
whatever legal arguments or advice the courts would find useful. 
Moreover, while federal courts certainly may ask the parties 
to a case to address particular legal arguments, we do not believe 
that those courts can ask nonparties for their view on federal law, 
 
 8 See Order, Log Cabin Republicans v United States, No 10-56634, *3 (9th Cir filed 
July 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2683238) (“Log Cabin Order”). See also 
Log Cabin Republicans v United States, 658 F3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir 2011). 
 9 See Log Cabin Order at *3. 
 10 See Part II.A. 
 11 See, for example, Harris v Quinn, 133 S Ct 72 (2012) (“The Solicitor General is 
invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”); Retractable 
Technologies, Inc v Becton, Dickinson and Co, 133 S Ct 72 (2012) (same).  
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be they in the executive branch, members of Congress, or legal 
experts.12 Basic differences between courts and legislatures, and 
between inquisitorial civil law systems and the federal courts, 
underlie this limit.13 Unlike congressional committees, federal 
courts cannot hold hearings in which legal experts submit testi-
mony and answer questions deemed relevant by judges and jus-
tices. Unlike the civil law inquisitorial system, Article III does 
not look to judges to call witnesses, assemble evidence, and oth-
erwise define the pertinent facts and legal issues.14 In our view, 
when the parties to the case are perfectly willing to advance all 
legal claims that a federal court deems relevant but the court 
nonetheless solicits legal arguments from nonparties, the court 
operates outside the boundaries of Article III. Because our ar-
gument suggests that the Supreme Court’s routine practice of 
seeking the legal advice of the solicitor general when the gov-
ernment is not a party is ultra vires, some may regard it as radi-
cal and hence mistaken. We demur. In our view, current practice 
is truly radical because it suggests there are no limits to the 
power of federal courts to seek legal advice from nonparties. If 
the Supreme Court regularly may request the views of the solici-
tor general, it may equally call for the wisdom of Professor Lau-
rence Tribe, the Chamber of Commerce, or former solicitors gen-
eral. In seeking to better declare what the law is, the Supreme 
Court has seized a power that Article III never confers. 
The questions raised in this Essay are distinct from a range 
of issues dividing academics and jurists over whether federal 
courts should adhere to a party-controlled dispute resolution 
model or, instead, a law declaration model.15 Under the party-
 
 12 Our Essay is limited to the question of federal courts seeking legal advice on is-
sues pertaining to federal law, and, consequently, we do not consider the question of fed-
eral courts certifying questions of state law to state courts. For an insightful treatment 
of this practice, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal 
Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 Cornell L Rev 1672 (2003) (examining whether 
a federal court can either temporarily relinquish or abstain jurisdiction in a case). 
 13 See Thomas D. Rowe Jr, Authorized Managerialism under the Federal Rules—
And the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 Sw U L Rev 191, 203–06 
(2007); James G. Apple and Robert P. Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System 37 
(Federal Judicial Center 1995). 
 14 See text accompanying notes 102–15. See also Rowe, 36 Sw U L Rev at 203–06 
(cited in note 13) (highlighting some similarities as well as differences between adversar-
ial and inquisitorial models). 
 15 See, for example, Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L J 447, 499–
508 (2009) (defending actions by judges that raise legal claims and arguments as con-
sistent with law pronouncements and adversary theory); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adver-
sarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L J 1, 53–68 (2011)  
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controlled model, courts would decide cases based on party fil-
ings and nothing else; there would be no place for courts seeking 
the views of nonparties. Under the law declaration model, how-
ever, the adversarial process yields in several respects. Courts 
may ask for argument on issues the parties do not raise, look to 
amicus briefs, use the internet to research issues, and appoint 
amici to litigate so-called orphaned issues that parties refuse to 
press.16 
Over the past decade, the law declaration model has made 
substantial inroads and arguably now dominates Supreme Court 
decision making.17 We think this development helps explain the 
growing tendency of federal courts to either order or solicit the 
views of DOJ lawyers. Federal courts increasingly see them-
selves less as umpires resolving party disputes and more as ac-
tive players in sorting out what legal rules and questions are 
relevant.18 
Nonetheless, the practice of either ordering or soliciting le-
gal opinions from nonparties is alien to Article III. More to the 
point, neither adjudicatory model suggests or supports a judicial 
power to demand or request legal advice. In our view, when both 
parties are willing and able to argue those legal issues deemed 
relevant by a court, that court cannot seek the assistance of a 
law professor, a blue-ribbon panel composed of members of the 
Supreme Court Bar, or the solicitor general. Solicitation of legal 
arguments is defensible only as a means of ensuring an adver-
sarial presentation of legal issues, meaning that such requests 
are permissible only when the parties will not advance pertinent 
legal arguments.19 
                                                                                                             
(arguing that courts’ nominal commitment to the adversarial model obscures their reli-
ance on extra-record facts and discussing the negative effects of assuming that all rele-
vant information is presented through the adversarial method); Gary Lawson, Stipulat-
ing the Law, 109 Mich L Rev 1191, 1227–34 (2011) (supporting party control of litigation 
including with respect to agreement on legal issues); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoid-
ing Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum L Rev 665, 679–85 
(2012) (exploring recent Supreme Court developments and linking them to increasing 
adoption of the law declaration model’s premises).  
 16 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 461–69 (cited in note 15); Gorod, 61 Duke L J at 26–35 
(cited in note 15). See also Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 
98 Va L Rev 1255, 1286–90 (2012); Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court 
Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 Stan L Rev 
907, 912–24 (2011) (surveying the history and characteristics of orphaned arguments 
and appointed amici at the US Supreme Court). 
 17 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 15). 
 18 Consider Frost, 59 Duke L J at 469 (cited in note 15). 
 19 See Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 939–41 (cited in note 16). 
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Some clarifications are in order. Ours is not a claim that the 
executive or Congress is constitutionally incapable of opining on 
legal matters, in a brief or otherwise. To the contrary, we think 
that the political branches may share their constitutional views 
with others. Furthermore, we admit that the courts and Con-
gress can compel the executive to provide facts, documents, and 
evidence.20 Hence we do not discuss subpoenas,21 compliance 
with the Brady rule (requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpato-
ry evidence),22 or situations where the government has unique 
access to facts that a court believes are necessary to decide a 
case. Moreover, our inquiry focuses on the constitutional powers 
of the three branches. We do not address whether Congress may 
delegate to the president or the courts the power to either de-
mand or request opinions from the other branches or private 
parties. In addition, our argument centers on the power of fed-
eral institutions. We do not discuss whether state institutions 
may compel legal advice of federal entities.23 Finally, we do not 
consider the merits of the law declaration model or the party-
controlled model.24 
Part I argues that federal courts cannot demand or compel 
legal advice from anyone—the political branches, the parties to 
a case, or nonparties. Part II contends that federal courts may 
not request opinions from nonparties when the actual parties 
are ready, willing, and able to address all legal questions posed 
by the courts. 
I.  JUDICIAL DEMANDS FOR LEGAL ADVICE 
In the course of deciding cases and controversies judges 
have the power to “say what the law is” in their judicial opin-
ions.25 This power is vital, for it not only helps resolve a particu-
lar case, it also generates case law that affects the course and 
resolution of subsequent disputes. Given its significance, the 
power to pronounce the law’s meaning should be exercised with 
care and an open mind. In deciding what the law is (and is not), 
 
 20 See 2 USC §§ 192–94; FRCP 37; FRCP 45. For a discussion of the constitutionali-
ty of this practice by the legislature, see McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135, 175 (1927). 
 21 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 713 (1974). 
 22 See Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 86–88 (1963). 
 23 Though we do not believe that the states enjoy such power, we do not address that 
question in our Essay as it would involve a detour into the federal-state relationship.  
 24 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 711–22 (cited in note 15). 
 25 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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a judge consults her own accumulated legal wisdom, the briefs, 
the oral arguments, and even Google search results.26 
Judges may conclude that in deciding what the law is, hear-
ing from experts in Congress and the executive branch is imper-
ative, even decisive. On any account of legal meaning, it is easy 
to see why such consultation could be useful. Should a court be-
lieve that intentions and purposes are relevant, members of 
Congress may have peculiar knowledge and expertise about con-
gressional intent. Where practice and policy matter to a court, 
executive officers have insights on both. Finally, members of 
Congress and executive officers may articulate arguments that 
speak to textualists on the bench who care neither about intent 
nor policy. 
If a judge sincerely believes that the solicitor general and 
the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee have 
much needed legal expertise—say, about whether a so-called 
penalty is really a tax for purposes of the Constitution27—may 
that judge demand or compel legal advice from these quarters? 
As discussed in Part I.A, despite the utility of political-
branch legal advice, the courts have neither power nor right to 
demand it. Such demands are ultra vires. Moreover, the courts 
have no right to such opinions because the Constitution never 
subordinates the executive or Congress to the judiciary by re-
quiring either to opine whenever a court would find an opinion 
useful in deciding what the law is.28 
Wholly apart from the separation of powers, demands for le-
gal opinions also are inconsistent with the autonomy parties en-
joy in litigation. As discussed in Part I.B, the parties decide 
which claims to bring and which arguments to press. Should a 
plaintiff bring a tort claim alone or append a contract claim? 
Should a defendant raise an unclean-hands defense or merely 
argue that the plaintiff has not satisfied the elements of the 
cause of action? The parties may decide these questions for 
 
 26 See Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1257–60 (cited in note 16). See also Robert Barnes, 
Should Supreme Court Justices Google?, Wash Post (July 8, 2012), online at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-08/politics/35489765_1_scalia-justices 
-federal-immigration-law (visited May 13, 2013).  
 27 See National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 
2594–2600 (2012). 
 28 When we say that the courts cannot compel legal advice from Congress or the 
executive, we mean no more than that the courts cannot compel, upon pain of contempt, 
the other branches to generate and yield up legal advice. While courts have held execu-
tive officials in contempt, we do not know of any instance in which they have held Con-
gress in contempt. 
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themselves taking into account their resources and interests. 
The alternative, one where courts decide which claims and ar-
guments a party to a suit must make, envisions far too much 
power in the courts. For instance, a power to compel arguments 
would imply a power to force parties to reveal their weakest 
points. Courts could even require parties to make arguments 
advancing their opponent’s cause as a means of edifying the 
court in its search for the law. As powerful as federal courts are, 
they cannot compel parties to make particular claims and argu-
ments, against interest or otherwise.29 
We conclude with brief comments explaining why, even if a 
court can decide matters against parties that fail to address ar-
guments that the court believes are relevant, such a power is not 
part of a general authority to demand legal argumentation. Ra-
ther if such retaliation is permissible, it is so only because the 
federal courts otherwise have power to decide cases without re-
gard to their legal merits. In other words, though there may be an 
ability to retaliate against parties that do not supply requested 
legal advice, that ability does not imply that parties are legally 
obliged to yield up advice whenever a court makes a demand. 
A. Demands for Legal Opinions from the Branches 
The Constitution never authorizes the federal courts to 
compel the political branches to say what the law is. The text 
never grants such power. The power is inconsistent with the 
separation of powers because it runs afoul of the independence 
and dignity that each branch enjoys. And there is no general 
practice of courts acting as if they could force the branches to 
opine for their benefit. 
As a matter of text, when the Constitution grants a power to 
demand information, of whatever sort, it is generally explicit.30 
 
 29 Again, when we say that the courts cannot compel legal advice from the parties 
to a case, we mean no more than that the courts cannot hold parties in civil contempt for 
the failure to supply such advice.  
 To be clear, courts may identify legal issues pertinent to the resolution of a dispute. 
For example, the Supreme Court sometimes calls upon parties to brief issues not raised 
by the parties, including whether the Court should overturn a precedent relevant to the 
resolution of the dispute. See Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 130 S Ct 
876, 893 (2010). If the parties refuse to brief these issues, the Court sometimes appoints 
an amicus to make arguments that the parties to a dispute are unwilling to make. For 
additional discussion, see text accompanying notes 120–24. 
 30 The power of Congress to subpoena information from private parties and public 
officials would seem to be an exception to our claim. But we think that such a power is a 
background feature of what it means to be a legislature, such that it is subsumed in 
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It usually does not leave such matters to shadowy implications of 
the basic power grants. Because no branch has an express, gener-
ic power to command the legal opinions of its counterparts, none 
of them may command the other two to provide legal opinions. 
Consider Article II and its grants of authority. The presi-
dent may demand the opinions in writing of the executive de-
partments.31 He may demand the advice of the Senate on trea-
ties and appointments, or so Article II strongly implies.32 One 
implication of the Opinions Clause is that the president cannot 
demand the opinions of judges, as the Justices concluded in 
1793.33 An implication of the Appointments and Treaty Clauses 
is that while the Senate is a council to the president with re-
spect to treaties and appointments,34 it is not a council with re-
spect to all matters. Hence the president has no right to the 
Senate’s opinions on pardons or faithful law execution. A sound 
inference from both provisions is that the president lacks gener-
ic power to demand the written opinions of, or oral advice from, 
the House, Senate, and federal courts. 
Drawing inferences about the powers of the other two 
branches from a consideration of the president’s powers in Arti-
cle II is admittedly more difficult. But perhaps it is reasonable 
to suppose that the creation of express executive duties has neg-
ative implications for whether other such duties also exist. If the 
president must share information or advice in particular areas, 
that suggests that he lacks a wide-ranging obligation to share 
information and advice. 
                                                                                                             
many legislative powers granted to Congress. The same might be said of the judiciary’s 
power to subpoena information—it too might be a background feature of courts. The 
power to demand legal advice, from whatever quarter, was not understood to be a back-
ground feature of the judicial power, or so we argue below. For additional discussion, see 
notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing judicial power to subpoena information). 
 31 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1 (“[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, 
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating 
to the Duties of their respective Offices.”). Alexander Hamilton argued that the Clause 
was redundant because the power was implicit in the hierarchical relationship between 
the president and department heads. See generally Federalist 74 (Hamilton), in The 
Federalist 500 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). We cite the Clause not for its effect 
on secretaries but for its implications vis-à-vis other branches. 
 32 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.  
 33 See John Jay and Associate Justices, Letter to President Washington (Aug 8, 
1793), in Henry P. Johnston, ed, 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 
488, 488–89 (Knickerbocker 1891) (“Jay-Washington Correspondence”). For further dis-
cussion, see text accompanying note 40. 
 34 See George Washington, Letter to Senate Committee on Treaties and Nomina-
tions (Aug 10, 1789), in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 4 The Founders’ Con-
stitution 62, 62–63 (Chicago 1987).  
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Consider the Presentment Clause.35 When the president ob-
jects to a presented bill, he must return it with “objections” to 
the originating chamber. If those objections are constitutional, 
he should explain why the bill would be unconstitutional if en-
acted into law. If those objections sound in policy, he should ex-
plain why the proposed policy changes are objectionable. In the 
course of stating his policy objections, his readings of current 
law and the bill will constitute (unwanted) legal advice to Con-
gress. The presence of this narrow duty to opine on what the 
Constitution, federal law, or a bill means suggests that there is 
no generic constitutional duty on the part of the president to 
supply legal advice to Congress. 
Or consider the State of the Union Clause.36 The president 
must share with Congress information about the Union. Although 
people today speak of this duty as if it is satisfied by an annual 
speech, the State of the Union, in fact the president complies 
whenever he conveys facts and impressions to Congress.37 It may 
well be that the president must provide legal advice of a sort 
when he provides information on the State of the Union. For in-
stance, if he believes that a statute is triggering unrest in cer-
tain portions of the Union, he may have to explain why the stat-
ute could be so read. But this legal advice would be narrowly 
related to the goal of addressing the State of the Union. By 
obliging the president to provide some information related to the 
Union but not requiring him to opine on all legal matters, we 
think the Clause implicitly suggests that Congress has no gener-
ic right to the executive’s legal advice. 
Our point is that when one juxtaposes the presence of spe-
cific duties related to opinions and information next to the con-
spicuous absence of an explicit generic Article II duty to supply 
legal opinions and the lack of any specific authority in Articles I 
and III to command such advice, the juxtaposition strongly sug-
gests that the Constitution itself never empowers Congress or 
 
 35 US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2–3 (providing that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed 
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented 
to the President of the United States” and describing the veto power and procedure). 
 36 US Const Art II, § 3, cl 1 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Infor-
mation of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures 
as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”). 
 37 See George Washington, Letter to the Senate and the House of Representatives 
(Jan 8, 1790), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 30 The Writings of George Washington from the 
Original Manuscript Sources 1745–1799 494, 494 (GPO 1939) (mentioning that aides 
would provide “such papers and estimates” to fulfill the president’s obligation under the 
State of the Union Clause). 
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the courts to demand the executive’s legal advice. In sum, the 
text neither authorizes judicial or congressional demands for legal 
advice nor obliges the executive to comply with such demands. 
Structure points in the same direction. The Constitution 
creates three independent and coequal branches. They are inde-
pendent in the sense that none is wholly dependent upon the 
others. They are coequal in the sense that they have an equal 
dignity, with none subordinate to the others. That independence 
and equality would be compromised if one branch could force 
another to opine on legal matters. By the same token, a generic 
duty to opine would tend to subordinate the institution so 
obliged. A broad power to demand legal advice from another 
branch implies a certain subordinacy in much the same way 
that the Opinions Clause suggests a subordinacy between the 
president and the department heads. To be sure, complete sub-
ordination does not automatically follow from a power to com-
mand opinions. But there is a subordinacy insofar as the power 
to command advice or a duty to supply it necessarily envisions 
one branch as the principal (the commander) and the other as 
the agent (the commanded). We believe that the Constitution’s 
structure suggests that the courts are not the aides or assistants 
of Congress or the president, even as they execute the laws 
made by both: the president is not the legal adviser of Congress 
or the courts, even as he must execute the laws of the former 
and the judgments of the latter, and Congress is certainly not a 
legal aid office for the courts or the executive. 
The inability of each branch to demand opinions from the 
others makes sense because each is fully capable of reaching its 
own legal conclusions. Members of Congress have aides, includ-
ing expert lawyers, who help them discern the meaning of feder-
al and state law. Additionally, members can hear expert testi-
mony from practitioners and professors. Similarly, each 
executive department has a general counsel’s office charged with 
making sense of the laws committed to it. Should difficult ques-
tions arise, executive officials can seek a legal opinion from the 
Office of Legal Counsel in the DOJ.38 Finally, the courts have 
their accumulated legal wisdom, party and amicus filings, the 
oral arguments, and their law clerks. Given the multiple sources 
of legal advice from which each branch may draw, none needs 
the power to require the legal advice of the others. 
 
 38 See 28 CFR § 0.25; 28 USC §§ 509, 510, 515–19. 
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What is implicit in text and structure also seems to have 
been accepted from the Constitution’s beginning. Long ago, Pres-
ident George Washington sought the advice of the Justices on 
legal questions related to the French Treaty of Alliance.39 The 
Justices demurred, saying that the “lines of separation drawn by 
the Constitution” afforded a “strong argument[ ]” that giving ju-
dicial advice would be inappropriate.40 We think the Constitu-
tion’s “lines of separation” similarly counsel against reading it as 
if it authorized any branch to demand the opinions of the others. 
As relevant for our purposes is the manner in which Secre-
tary of State Thomas Jefferson sought the legal advice of the 
Justices. Jefferson’s letter declared that Washington would be 
“much relieved” if the Justices could answer several legal ques-
tions related to the treaty.41 He then “asked” for the attendance 
of the Justices to further inquire whether the public could bene-
fit from their opinions.42 We think the letter suggests that nei-
ther Washington nor Jefferson believed that the president could 
demand the opinions of the justices. After the Justices declined, 
the lack of any executive pushback or protest suggests the same. 
Washington could do no more than request their advice because 
it was obvious that he had no constitutional right to it. 
Another episode suggests that Congress did not believe it 
could command opinions. During the extraordinarily long debate 
that preceded the Decision of 1789,43 it never occurred to mem-
bers of Congress that they might demand that the holdover sec-
retaries of the executive departments provide their expert opin-
ion on the best way to read the Constitution. Congress never 
sought such opinions despite the fact that secretaries regularly 
gave opinions to the predecessor Continental Congress. Members 
of Congress likely understood that while the secretaries were 
their assistants under the old order, they were not so under the 
Constitution. More to the point, members perhaps recognized that 
 
 39 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court 
of the United States (July 18, 1793), in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 6 The Writings of Thom-
as Jefferson 351, 351–52 (Knickerbocker 1895) (“Jefferson–Supreme Court Letter”).   
 40 See Jay-Washington Correspondence at 488–89 (cited in note 33).  
 41 Jefferson–Supreme Court Letter at 351 (cited in note 39). 
 42 Id. 
 43 The Decision of 1789 relates to the statutes passed by the First Congress that 
implied that the president had a constitutional power to remove executive officers. For a 
discussion of this episode, see generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision 
of 1789, 91 Cornell L Rev 1021 (2006).  
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the Constitution did not empower them to draw upon the legal 
wisdom of executive branch officials.44 
We are unaware of any early incident suggesting that the 
courts are without power to demand the opinions of the execu-
tive or Congress. Yet perhaps more instructive is that the courts 
apparently never made such demands, despite the utility of such 
opinions. The Washington administration housed some of the 
finest legal minds of the era, including Alexander Hamilton, 
Edmund Randolph, and Thomas Jefferson.45 The courts surely 
could have benefitted from their wisdom. The absence of any 
such orders makes sense, for it is hard to suppose that as the 
Justices were denying that they should respond to Washington’s 
request for advice, they simultaneously supposed that they had 
Article III power to demand opinions of the President. We be-
lieve that during the Federalist era, the courts were not thought 
to possess a generic power to treat executive branch officials as 
involuntary clerks.46   
When we expand our inquiry beyond this early era, we are 
unaware of any practice in which the courts demanded to know 
what the president or leading members of Congress thought the 
law was. Chief Justice John Marshall never issued a rule to 
members of Congress seeking legal opinions on when an ap-
pointment vests.47 Chief Justice Roger Taney never demanded to 
know the opinions of members on whether Dred Scott could be a 
citizen and whether he had been freed by virtue of his travels in-
to the Northwest Territory.48 Justice Rufus Peckham never di-
rected the executive or Congress to file a brief about the validity 
of New York’s law limiting the work hours of bakers under the 
 
 44 The First Congress did pass a statute obliging the Treasury secretary to provide 
various materials to Congress. See An Act to Establish the Treasury Department § 2, 
ch 12, 1 Stat 65, 65–66 (1789), codified as amended at 31 USC § 301. But these reports 
were to concern plans for the collection of revenue and for the support of the public cred-
it. They did not relate to the meaning of the law. It should be noted that some opposed 
this reporting requirement on the ground that it violated separation-of-powers princi-
ples. They thought that giving an executive officer such a role in legislation smacked too 
much of the English ministry. See Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 281 (Penguin 
2004).  In any event, this requirement was a statutory imposition, something unneces-
sary if Congress had a constitutional power to demand opinions of the executive. 
 45 See R. Gordon Hoxie, The Cabinet in the American Presidency, 1789–1984, 14 
Pres Stud Q 209, 211–14 (1984). 
 46 For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s order to show cause issued to James 
Madison in Marbury, see text accompanying notes 58–59. 
 47 See generally Marbury, 5 US 137.  
 48 See Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393, 403 (1856).  
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Fourteenth Amendment.49 If there is evidence from pre-modern 
practice of a generic judicial power to demand legal advice from 
the political branches, it has remained remarkably hidden. 
Lest our point be misunderstood, we add two caveats. First, 
our argument does not reach the duty of the executive to share 
information with the branches, particularly information under 
its control. We believe that information requests directed to the 
executive related to documents and testimony are cut from a dif-
ferent cloth than are demands for legal opinions. As noted earli-
er, the executive must provide information to Congress as part 
of its State of the Union obligation.50 The executive likewise has 
an obligation to provide evidence to the courts. That is the les-
son of United States v Nixon,51 and it is one that goes back to 
President Thomas Jefferson’s tangle with Chief Justice Marshall 
during the trial of Aaron Burr.52 
Such information requests, when fulfilled, help a coordinate 
branch make decisions committed to it. Knowledge of certain 
facts peculiarly within the purview of the executive is typically 
crucial for Congress to decide if new laws are needed, existing 
laws ought to be reformed, or the executive has committed an 
impeachable offense. Similarly, the executive must sometimes 
disclose facts and documents to the courts if the latter are to de-
cide cases. 
In contrast to the need for facts that are peculiarly known to 
the executive, there simply is no need for the courts or Congress 
to access the legal conclusions formed in the executive branch. 
Again we admit that the executive’s legal opinions would be use-
ful to the other branches. Yet their bare utility does not author-
ize the other branches to demand them, particularly in a context 
in which each branch has ample means to reach its own legal 
conclusions. 
Second, our argument against compelled legal opinions does 
not deny that each branch may choose to share its legal opinions 
with others. There was a time when some thought that one 
branch should not share its views about how another branch 
 
 49 See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 53–56 (1905). 
 50 The executive is also obligated to provide information to Congress in conjunction 
with legitimate exercises of Congress’s subpoena authority. See note 30. For a discussion 
of the ways in which Congress and the executive negotiate over the boundaries of Con-
gress’s subpoena power, see generally Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information 
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 Admin L Rev 109 (1996). 
 51 418 US 683 (1974). 
 52 United States v Burr, 25 F Cases 30, 30–34 (CC D Va 1807).  
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ought to exercise its powers.53 The supposed bar likely was based 
on the notion that such advice would constitute an intrusion into 
the prerogatives of another branch.54 But we think that view is 
mistaken, as it raises the wall of separation between the branches 
much too high. We believe that each political branch may advise 
the other two branches and the public, without limit.55  
B.  Demands for Legal Opinions from the Parties 
Until this point, our focus has been on the separation of 
powers. But another facet of our argument rests on the princi-
ples of party autonomy and the limited power of federal courts. 
We believe that the parties to a case have the right to decide 
which claims and arguments to make. A court’s authority to say 
what the law is does not permit the court to compel whatever le-
gal advice might facilitate the exercise of that authority. 
We recognize that our argument may strike some as contra-
ry to current practices, and hence counterintuitive. Judges may 
seem quasi-sovereign over their (rather limited) territory. Ju-
rists wear ceremonial robes, insist upon decorum and civility, 
and command respect. But these trappings hardly suggest that 
the judicial power has little or no limits. In particular, the con-
siderable authority that judges wield in their courtrooms by no 
means suggests that they may order parties to make unwanted 
arguments, any more than it means that judges can force indi-
viduals in their courts to file unwanted suits. 
We freely admit that when a court is seized of a case, it has 
a raft of powers that arise from what it means to be a court. Ar-
ticle III obviously grants some authority over the case proceed-
ings and some authority over the parties themselves. A partial 
list would include the power to impose decorum, to control ad-
mission to their bar, to punish contempt, to compel disclosure of 
 
 53 Washington complained to Jefferson that congressional requests to convey salu-
tations to foreign nations was an invasion of the executive. See Thomas Jefferson, Note 
(March 12, 1792), in Franklin B. Sawvel, ed, The Complete ANAS of Thomas Jefferson 
68, 68–69 (Round Table 1903). 
 54 See Jay-Washington Correspondence at 488–89 (cited in note 33). 
 55 In our view, the branches ought to share their views with each other as a means 
of fulfilling their vow to support the Constitution. If one branch can help another arrive 
at the correct legal conclusion, then the Constitution is better defended. Moreover, a re-
gime where the branches share their legal views may lead to a more stable understand-
ing of the Constitution. See Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Po-
litical Instability, 84 Va L Rev 83, 106 (1998). 
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evidence and facts, and to dismiss stale suits.56 But this power 
does not include the qualitatively different authority to compel 
legal advice or arguments. The difference is that while the above 
powers are arguably necessary for the court to function and have 
long been thought so, the power to demand legal advice is hardly 
necessary for proper judicial functioning and, to our knowledge, 
has never been thought to be so. 
Notwithstanding the modern movements away from the 
dispute resolution model and toward the law declaration model 
and other innovations in judicial practices,57 the parties retain a 
great measure of autonomy. In every case before a court, each 
party decides for itself what claims it will bring and which ar-
guments it will make. A plaintiff may decide not to bring a plau-
sible tort claim and to raise a contract claim only. The defendant 
may elect, for whatever reason, to omit a potentially successful 
defense or not bring a colorable counterclaim. Courts cannot 
force parties to articulate arguments, claims, or defenses, even if 
they suspect that they are legally valid or case dispositive. 
This has long been the case, as far as we know. In Marbury 
v Madison,58 Chief Justice Marshall never suggested that James 
Madison had violated a constitutional or legal duty by failing to 
submit any response to the Court’s rule (the order to show cause 
why a mandamus should not issue).59 Though Marshall con-
demned the failure to issue a commission to William Marbury, 
he never faulted Madison for his default. Marshall ought to have 
found Madison in contempt if the Secretary of State was legally 
obliged to provide an answer to the Court’s order to show 
cause.60 
In the modern context, when the Supreme Court decides 
which legal questions to hear, the parties are free to demur. It is 
not uncommon for the Court to grant certiorari in a case where 
the party who won below chooses not to litigate any further.61 In 
these circumstances the Court has never held such a party in 
contempt or more generally claimed a power to direct the re-
spondent to expend funds and argue as the Court would have 
 
 56 See Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 43 (1991). 
 57 See notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 58 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 59 Id at 153–54.  
 60 See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 US 378, 383 (1919). 
 61 For a sampling of cases in which one or both parties to a dispute refuse to pursue 
potentially germane legal issues, see Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 918–39 (cited in 
note 16). 
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them litigate. The Court instead asks an amicus to argue the 
questions presented.62 This means of satisfying the Court’s appe-
tite for particular arguments suggests that the Court does not 
believe that it may simply order the parties to contest legal 
questions.63 
To be sure, when a court asks a party to pursue a point not 
found in their filings, parties typically accept the invitation. A 
party may even welcome the invitation, say when it seems likely 
to help it prevail. But it is an invitation, not a command. Like all 
invitations it may be declined, to the chagrin of the inviter. And 
it will be declined if the party believes it gains nothing by doing 
what the court desires. Again, sometimes parties before the 
highest court in the land decline to address an issue that the 
Court believes is relevant. In these cases, the Court never acts 
as if the party has violated a duty. What is true for the Supreme 
Court is no less true for the inferior courts. 
If we step back for a moment and consider the consequences 
of a power to demand legal advice of parties, we can see why the 
courts have not generally asserted the power. To begin with, 
there is the problem associated with the breadth of such a pow-
er. If courts could force parties to make legal arguments, a court 
could force the plaintiff to amend her complaint and bring ancil-
lary claims the plaintiff would otherwise not wish to bring. The 
court might command the plaintiff to bring a contract claim in 
addition to the tort claim that was actually part of her com-
plaint. In many cases this would waste resources and act as a 
deterrent to the initiation of suits because bringing a suit could 
lead the party to incur all sorts of uncertain costs as the court 
seized control of the litigation. 
Going further, a power to compel legal advice could be used 
to force the parties to yield up the weakest points of their own 
arguments. “Tell us all the flaws in your briefs and pleadings,” a 
court might demand, and the parties would be obliged to comply, 
on pain of contempt, with potentially disastrous results for one 
side. While courts might ask some variant of this question dur-
ing oral arguments, counsel often evades the question in some 
clever way. If courts can compel such concessions, however, the 
evasion would be contemptuous. 
 
 62 See id at 918–19. 
 63 Alternatively, it may be that the Court does not believe that compelled argu-
ments will be good ones. 
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At the extreme, a power to demand legal opinions from par-
ties could be used to force both parties to file briefs and motions 
advancing the other party’s cause. The plaintiff might be forced 
to lodge a filing refuting her complaint. The defendant could be 
compelled to file documents suggesting that his legal defense is 
without merit. The obligation would extend beyond the filings to 
the oral arguments. In a case where one party has an extraordi-
nary oral advocate, a court might greatly benefit from being able 
to force that lawyer to argue both sides. 
Those who believe that federal courts may force a party to 
make arguments must defend all of this. Or, at the very least, 
they must articulate and defend a line that permits a court to 
order some arguments, claims, and opinions and not others. We 
do not believe that this can be done with success.64 
Our task is simpler, for our line is cleaner. We do not believe 
that the power to decide cases and controversies includes any 
power, sweeping or narrow, to force parties to articulate legal 
arguments on demand. To find such a power in Article III is to 
read too much into it. The commencement of a case does not 
grant a court the power to force a party to articulate any legal 
claims or arguments, much less the best argument against the 
party’s interests.65 
What is true for parties seems even truer for nonparties; the 
latter cannot be forced to articulate claims, arguments, and 
opinions. While courts have the power to compel information 
from nonparties, such as witnesses or custodians of evidence, 
that is not the same as being able to treat a nonparty as a font of 
legal wisdom. A district court cannot dragoon either former So-
licitor General Seth Waxman or former Solicitor General Paul 
 
 64 One might suppose that courts can force a party to advance only those argu-
ments that are potentially advantageous to that party. This seems simple enough in the-
ory but is fraught with difficulties. A court may wish to hear a particular argument and 
issue an order compelling as much. But the party so compelled may already have con-
cluded that a particular argument is wholly meritless and hence not worth advancing. At 
this point, the party will be forced to make claims or argue points for no other reason 
than to satisfy the court’s legal curiosity. The end result, more likely than not, is that the 
court ultimately reaches the same conclusion. This is all a waste of resources, suggesting 
that there are sound policy reasons underlying party autonomy. See Larsen, 98 Va L Rev 
at 1302–03 (cited in note 16); Frost, 59 Duke L J at 461 (cited in note 15). As compared 
to the courts, the parties are generally better positioned to know which arguments best 
advance their goals. 
 65 Courts, of course, are free to raise legal issues they think germane to the legal 
dispute and ask the parties to address those issues. If the parties refuse, however, courts 
cannot compel such arguments but, instead, may appoint amici to make those argu-
ments. See text accompanying notes 116–19. 
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Clement into supplying legal advice, with or without compensa-
tion for service rendered, because the federal courts have no 
power to require legal service on demand.  As important as the 
law declaration function is, Article III does not authorize the 
conscription of bystanders. 
C.  The Possibility of Judicial Reprisals 
If we are right that the federal courts lack a constitutional 
power to demand legal advice, two things follow. First, those 
who ignore a judicial demand for an opinion do no violence to the 
Constitution. Ignoring an ultra vires order is perfectly legal. Sec-
ond, courts cannot punish for failure to comply with such de-
mands. If a court demands an opinion and the executive chooses 
not to supply legal advice, the court cannot fine or jail the officers 
who rebuff it. Likewise, a judge cannot punish a private party’s 
failure to opine as the judge would have it. In sum, those who re-
fuse judicial demands for legal advice are not contemnors. 
Can a court do something short of punishing via fine or jail 
time? Courts sometimes decide a legal question against a party 
when the party fails to address it.66 We are unsure of what to 
make of this practice. Although it is common, it is in tension 
with the notion that courts should decide cases consistently with 
the law. If a plaintiff files a meritless complaint and the defend-
ant elects to ignore the judicial summons issued in response, 
perhaps the court ought to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s 
complaint before deciding the case and not merely sanction the 
defendant for its absence.67 That is what Chief Justice Marshall 
did in Marbury. He did not rule that William Marbury had been 
appointed simply because James Madison never addressed the 
matter.68 
In any event, deciding an issue against a party because that 
party fails to address it is not the same as punishing that party 
for having violated the law. Consider a different context. A 
branch often retaliates against another as a means of displaying 
its displeasure. The executive may veto legislation to exhibit his 
unhappiness stemming from the Senate’s rejection of a treaty. 
Congress may curb a court’s jurisdiction to signal its discontent 
 
 66 See, for example, Dred Scott, 60 US at 399–404, 429–30. 
 67 See Arthur J. Park, Fixing Faults in the Current Default Judgment Framework, 
34 Campbell L Rev 155, 155–58 (2011). 
 68 See generally Marbury, 5 US 137 (omitting discussion of whether Marbury 
should receive a commission by reference to Madison’s default). 
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with the latter’s judicial decisions.69 Such retaliation is not taken 
to mean that the victimized branch necessarily has violated a 
constitutional duty or that the retaliating branch enjoys a con-
stitutional right that was somehow violated. All it typically 
means is that a branch is using a discretionary power to retali-
ate and thereby conveying its displeasure. So if Congress pares 
the White House budget because members do not like the presi-
dent’s economic agenda, that cut does not imply that the agenda 
is somehow illegal or unconstitutional. 
Similarly, if the courts can decide an issue or a case against 
a party based on that party’s failure to make a legal argument 
that the court desires, that power to so rule does not necessarily 
imply a constitutional power to compel the production of opin-
ions. It likely means that the court has a limited power to decide 
an argument or case without regard to the merits and has cho-
sen to exercise it, probably as a means of expressing its irrita-
tion with a party. The power to retaliate against a litigant in 
this way does not imply a power to compel the production of le-
gal arguments for the benefit of a court, even as it often has the 
in terrorem effect of inducing compliance. 
* * *  
Before considering judicial requests for opinions, a summa-
tion might prove helpful. The federal courts cannot compel the 
executive or Congress to produce legal opinions. Any such power 
would make either branch something of a permanent clerk of the 
courts, a status inconsistent with their independence and equal-
ity. If such an extraordinary power were given to the courts, it 
surely would be found in a specific provision and not left to im-
plication. It follows that neither Congress nor the president 
must comply with any demand for legal advice the courts might 
make. Satisfaction is a matter of prudence or desire to help the 
court, not a course of action the Constitution obliges. 
More generally, we believe in the principle of party autono-
my. The parties rightfully decide which claims to make and 
which arguments best further those claims. After all it is their 
case. Federal courts lack power to force litigants to articulate le-
gal arguments merely because the courts wish to adjudicate 
 
 69 See, for example, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect Marriage for the 
States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 7–8 (2004), online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CHRG-108hhrg94458/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg94458.pdf (visited May 13, 2013). 
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them. In particular, federal judges cannot compel a litigant to 
amend her complaint to include new claims or to file motions 
that address issues that the court wishes to consider. Any such 
power would suggest that the courts could force one party to ar-
ticulate arguments for its opponent, something we are sure is 
beyond the power of an Article III court. 
When the Fifth Circuit demanded a legal opinion announc-
ing the DOJ’s views on judicial review and insisted that the let-
ter address President Obama’s claim about the Affordable Care 
Act,70 it lacked authority to compel the production of an opinion. 
When the DOJ yielded up the three-page letter in forty-eight 
hours, as the Fifth Circuit panel demanded, it acted under no 
real legal compunction. Habit, respect, and a desire to curry fa-
vor might have compelled the production, but not the Constitu-
tion itself.71 Despite the crucial role that judges play in our con-
stitutional system and despite their need to correctly discern 
what the law is, the Constitution never places the executive, or 
parties to a case more generally, on a retainer for the benefit of 
the judiciary. 
II.  JUDICIAL REQUESTS FOR LEGAL ADVICE FROM NONPARTIES 
What then of judicial requests for legal opinions? If the fed-
eral courts cannot force the executive, Congress, or members of 
the public to supply them with legal advice, perhaps judges can 
request that guidance. The separation-of-powers concerns artic-
ulated in Part I seem less salient here. In the face of judicial re-
quests, Congress and the executive ostensibly remain independ-
ent and need only supply the courts with legal opinions that 
serve their institutional interests. Indeed, congressional offices 
as well as the DOJ frequently file amicus briefs on their own ini-
tiative. So why would it be problematic for federal courts to re-
quest legal advice from these branches, or for that matter, the 
general public? 
Below we explain why judicial requests for legal opinions from 
nonparties are generally impermissible.72 Specifically, Article III 
 
 70 See text accompanying notes 1–5. 
 71 See text accompanying notes 64–65.  
 72 Our claim in this Part solely concerns judicial requests for advice from nonparties 
on questions of federal law. We believe that the federal courts may solicit legal advice and 
argumentation from the parties to a case. Such requests can run the gamut from a mere 
plea for clarification of existing arguments to an appeal to address wholly new legal con-
cerns that the courts believe might be relevant. As noted in Part I, however, any such  
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does not authorize federal judges to request the legal opinions of 
Congress, the executive, or private interests. Article III does not 
replicate the civil law inquisitorial system or empower courts to 
act as if they were congressional committees. We agree that fed-
eral judges may accord more weight to the filings of the solicitor 
general or top Supreme Court advocates—expertise has its ad-
vantages.73 Yet such possibilities hardly imply that federal judg-
es have a generic power to request legal advice from nonparties. 
We begin by briefly detailing Supreme Court practices gov-
erning requests for legal advice to give the reader a sense of the 
lay of the land. The Supreme Court routinely calls for the views 
of the solicitor general (CVSG), a practice that has transformed 
the workload of the solicitor general and the Court’s relations 
with the executive branch.74 We also consider whether such re-
quests impermissibly favor the arguments of Court-anointed ad-
vocates. Finally, we suggest that, under current practice, noth-
ing prevents the Court or its lower-court counterparts from 
actively soliciting legal advice from anyone. 
We then turn to our argument. First, we explain why re-
quests for legal advice are anathema to the federal legal system. 
Unlike inquisitorial civil law systems or congressional commit-
tees, the federal courts generally lack the power to request legal 
advice. Second, we discuss the larger debate about whether 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, should simply resolve le-
gal issues identified by the litigants or, instead, embrace a law 
declaration model in which the judicial role in “saying what the 
law is” is paramount. Under the law declaration model (but not 
the dispute resolution model), courts can call sua sponte for 
briefing on issues they deem relevant to the resolution of a dis-
pute75 and appoint amici to make arguments that a court identi-
fies as salient and which one or both parties are unwilling to 
                                                                                                             
requests for clarification or new argumentation are mere requests and are not constitu-
tionally mandatory. See notes 56–65 and accompanying text. Courts, however, may appoint 
amici to advance arguments abandoned by the parties to a dispute. See text accompanying 
notes 116–19. See also note 12 (discussing federal court certification of state law issues to 
state courts). 
  73 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court: 
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Georgetown L J 1487, 1493–1501 
(2008); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A 
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev Litig 669, 697–98 (2008). 
 74 See Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Call-
ing for the Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J S Ct Hist 35, 35, 37–39, 47 (2010). 
 75 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 683, 689–91 (cited in note 15).  
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pursue.76 Whichever model (law declaration or dispute resolu-
tion) is superior, neither supports a judicial power to request 
advice when both parties respond to all issues deemed relevant 
by a court. 
The only time a federal court may request legal advice from 
nonparties is when a party to a case is unwilling to address an 
argument that the court deems relevant to a legal dispute 
properly before it. In cases where a party refuses to argue a par-
ticular point (“orphaned argument”) or refuses to defend the 
case entirely (“orphaned case”), the federal courts may appoint 
an amicus to argue the point or the case in order to ensure that 
the courts receive adversarial arguments on matters properly 
before them. Even as we take aim at the federal courts’ general 
power to request legal advice from nonparties, we do not take is-
sue with these narrow practices. 
The end result is the surprising (but we think correct) con-
clusion that a current and routine practice, the CVSG, is uncon-
stitutional because the federal courts generally lack the power to 
request legal advice of nonparties. Although Congress might be 
able to authorize the judiciary to make such requests via its Ar-
ticle I powers,77 Article III’s adversarial system never authorizes 
the federal courts to act as if they had the powers of a civil law 
inquisitorial court or a congressional investigation committee. 
A.  Supreme Court Requests for Legal Advice 
For at least sixty years, the Supreme Court has sought legal 
advice from the solicitor general of the United States in cases in 
which the government is not a party.78 Sometimes the Court calls 
for an amicus merits brief from the solicitor general (as it did in 
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka79 and other landmark War-
ren Court rulings80). These requests, however, are quite rare (usu-
ally no more than one or two a year).81 More typically (especially in 
 
 76 See notes 116–20, 136 and accompanying text. 
 77 See notes 101 and 138. 
 78 See Lepore, 35 J S Ct Hist at 37–39 (cited in note 74). We focus on the Supreme 
Court because we are unaware of any statistics compiled about the nature and frequency 
of lower court requests for legal advice. 
 79 347 US 483 (1954) (“Brown I”).  
 80 See Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of 
Law 26–32 (Knopf 1987). See also Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 349 US 294 
(1955) (“Brown II”). 
 81 See Timothy R. Johnson, The Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, and the Sep-
aration of Powers, 31 Am Polit Rsrch 426, 427 (2003) (noting average of 2.15 requests per 
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recent years), the Court calls for the views of the solicitor general 
on whether it should grant certiorari in a case.82 In about twenty-
three cases a year, the solicitor general submits a filing in re-
sponse to a CVSG certiorari request.83 
CVSGs significantly impact the Office of the Solicitor Gen-
eral and help define the relationship between the solicitor gen-
eral and other parts of the executive branch and the Court. To 
start, even though CVSGs technically are requests, the solicitor 
general “regards participation as mandatory; the office invaria-
bly files an amicus brief in response, and then generally contin-
ues to participate as an amicus at the merits stage if the Court 
grants the case.”84 Executive branch compliance with CVSGs is 
so routine and complete that some suggest that the solicitor 
general has come to resemble a “judicial officer.”85 Such habitual 
                                                                                                             
year from 1953 to 1986). Over the past five years, we could locate only two such requests. 
See Fred Dingledy, Reference Librarian at William & Mary Law School, Email to Neal 
Devins, Professor at William & Mary Law School (July 30, 2012) (on file with authors). 
In understanding why there are next to no merits-briefs requests today, we suspect that 
the Court sees no need to reach out to the solicitor general, for the solicitor general, on 
its own initiative, submits merits briefs in most cases. See note 87. 
 82 See notes 83–88 and accompanying text. See also Ryan C. Black and Ryan J. 
Owens, The Solicitor General and the United States Supreme Court: Executive Branch 
Influence and Judicial Decisions 49–71 (Cambridge 2012); David C. Thompson and 
Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Proce-
dures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 Geo 
Mason L Rev 237, 278–87 (2009). 
 83 See Fred Dingledy, Reference Librarian at William & Mary Law School, Memo-
randum to Neal Devins, Professor at William & Mary Law School (July 13, 2012) (on file 
with authors). CVSG requests have spiked over the past four terms; the number of re-
quests was around fourteen per year  from 2000 to 2004. See Thompson and Wachtell, 16 
Geo Mason L Rev at 284 (cited in note 82).  
 84 Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s 
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 BC L Rev 1323, 1354 (2010). See also Black 
and Owens, Solicitor General at 51 (cited in note 82) (referring to the CVSG as an “order” 
and a “command”); Michael J. Bailey and Forrest Maltzman, Inter-branch Communication: 
When Does the Court Solicit Executive Branch Views? *3 (unpublished manuscript, Oct 7, 
2005), online at http://home.gwu.edu/~forrest/fmcvsg.pdf (visited May 13, 2013). The solici-
tor general invariably complies because doing so cultivates her relationship with the Court, 
thereby enhancing both the status of her office and her ability to advance the president’s 
legal policy agenda before the Supreme Court. See Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash, 
The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 Colum L Rev 507, 537–45 (2012).  
 85 For Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the solicitor general is a “true friend of the 
Court” when responding to CVSG requests; for former Solicitor General Drew Days, the 
solicitor general operates not as an advocate but as an “officer of that court” through the 
CVSG process. Thompson and Wachtell, 16 Geo Mason L Rev at 270–71 (cited in note 
82). For an alternative account of why the Court makes CVSG requests, see Bailey and 
Maltzman, Inter-branch Communication at *7–10 (cited in note 84) (arguing that the 
justices seek out the views of the executive branch for strategic reasons, including an 
assessment of potential executive branch resistance to their decision making). 
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compliance with CVSGs constrains the solicitor general’s ability 
to advance the president’s agenda before the Court. Indeed, 
when one compares the number of cases in which the solicitor 
general responds to CVSGs (approximately twenty-three cases 
per year) with the number of cases where the solicitor general 
seeks certiorari on its own initiative (about sixteen cases per 
year),86 it is remarkable how much today’s solicitor general oper-
ates at the Court’s beck and call.87 Rather than shaping the 
number and types of case through its own certiorari filings, the 
modern solicitor general is largely reactive, taking her direction 
from the Court. By responding to CVSGs, solicitors general act 
as “extra law clerks for the Court,” pitching in “[w]hen times 
g[e]t busy” and otherwise.88  
While the vast majority of the Supreme Court’s requests for 
legal advice are addressed to the solicitor general, the Supreme 
Court has sought nonparty advice from Congress, state attor-
neys general, and private parties. Requests for the advice of the 
chambers of Congress date back to at least Myers v United 
States,89 where the Court actively sought the advice of the Con-
gress on whether the president had constitutional power to uni-
laterally remove a postmaster in the face of a statute that re-
quired the Senate’s concurrence.90 The practice of seeking the 
advice of state officials is “extremely rare” with “only a handful 
 
 86 See Cordray and Cordray, 51 BC L Rev at 1348 (cited in note 84). See also Adam 
D. Chandler, Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zeal-
ous Advocate?, 121 Yale L J 725, 728 (2011). 
 87 Changes in the solicitor general’s practice of filing amicus briefs also call atten-
tion to how today’s Office of the Solicitor General operates in the Court’s shadow. Today, 
the solicitor general files amicus briefs in most cases in which the government does not 
appear as a party. See Cordray and Cordray, 51 BC L Rev at 1353–55 (cited in note 84) 
(noting that the solicitor general has participated in more than 75 percent of Supreme 
Court cases since 1994 through CVSGs and amicus briefs). By way of comparison, the 
solicitor general filed around fifty certiorari petitions per year during the 1980s and filed 
amicus briefs in around one-third of cases in which the government was not a party. See 
id at 1348–55.  
 88 Bailey and Maltzman, Inter-branch Communication at *5 (cited in note 84). For a 
provocative argument that links the Court’s shrinking docket to the solicitor general’s grow-
ing hesitancy to file certiorari petitions, see Cordray and Cordray, 51 BC L Rev at 1366–69 
(cited in note 84). See also Chandler, Comment, 121 Yale L J at 729–32 (cited in note 86) 
(arguing that the solicitor general is abdicating his responsibility to be an advocate). 
 89 272 US 52 (1926). 
 90 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers and Its Wayward Successors: Going 
Postal on the Removal Power, in Christopher H. Schroeder and Curtis A. Bradley, eds, 
Presidential Power Stories 165, 171 (Foundation 2009). 
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of examples in the past few decades.”91 The most recent example 
was in 2009 when the Court called for the views of the Solicitor 
General of Texas on whether it should grant certiorari in a 
right-to-counsel case.92 Requests for legal opinions from private 
parties typically take place after the Court has granted certiora-
ri and one of the parties to a dispute is unwilling to argue an is-
sue that the Court deems relevant.93 In these cases (usually one 
per year), the Court may request that an attorney appear as 
amicus to advance the abandoned argument.94 
To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never revealed 
the source of its generic power to request opinions. Whatever its 
source, the power appears to be without limit. Under current 
practice, the Court might request opinions of trade groups (the 
Chamber of Commerce), associations dedicated to individual 
rights (the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the National Rifle 
Association), academic groups (the American Society for Legal 
History and the American Law and Economics Association), law 
professors (Pamela Karlan, Michael McConnell, and Neal 
Katyal), and elite members of the Supreme Court Bar (Maureen 
Mahoney and Carter Phillips).95 The Supreme Court might even 
 
 91 Amy Howe, More on CVSG-Texas in Rhine v. Deaton, SCOTUSblog (Oct 5, 2009), 
online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/10/more-on-cvsg-texas-in-rhine-v-deaton (visit-
ed May 13, 2013). 
 92 See Rhine v Deaton, 130 S Ct 357 (2009) (“The Solicitor General of Texas is invit-
ed to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the State of Texas.”); Howe, CVSG-
Texas (cited in note 91). See also Fred Dingledy, Research Librarian at William & Mary 
Law School, Memorandum to Neal Devins, Professor at William & Mary Law School 
(Aug 1, 2012) (identifying Rhine as the only case in which the Court sought out the views 
of a state solicitor general since 2006).  
 93 Of course, the Court first asks the parties to the dispute to address the relevant 
legal claims. For example, in cases where one party has filed a petition for certiorari and 
the other party has not responded to that petition, the Court sometimes “request[s] a 
response to the petition [from the winner below] . . . and will defer action on the case un-
til the views and arguments of the respondent[s] have been made known.” Eugene 
Gressman, et al, Supreme Court Practice 508 (BNA 9th ed 2007). For an empirical study 
of so-called Calls for Responses (CFRs), see Thompson and Wachtell, 16 Geo Mason L 
Rev at 245–70 (cited in note 82) (documenting that parties treat CFRs as orders). Where 
the party fails to respond, the Court may appoint amici to take on the orphaned case. See 
Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 933–39 (cited in note 16). 
 94 See Adam Liptak, For Some Orphaned Arguments, Court-Appointed Guardians, 
NY Times A16 (Dec 14, 2010). For additional discussion, see notes 61–62, 136. 
 95 For an example of invited briefs from legal academics, see Brief of Amicus Curiae 
by Invitation of the Court, Tapia v United States, No 10-5400, *1 (US filed Mar 10, 2011) 
(available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 882592) (Stephanos Bibas, James A. Feldman, Nancy 
Bregstein Gordon, and Amy Wax). For examples of invited briefs from elite members of 
the Supreme Court Bar, see Brief of the Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Judgment below, Dorsey v United States, Nos 11-5685, 11-5721, *1 (US filed Mar 8, 
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find an advisory panel composed of former solicitors general es-
pecially helpful in deciding whether to grant certiorari and how 
to dispose of cases on the merits, even more so than receiving 
advice from the current solicitor general. There is often wisdom 
in the views culled from many expert minds.96 
Some may find these possibilities troubling because they be-
lieve that it is improper either to call for the views of an advo-
cate for only one side of an issue or to elevate particular interest 
groups or lawyers. Such judicial requests may undermine the 
sense that a case is considered on the merits and not because of 
judicial favoritism. Put another way, some may conclude that the 
systematic use of favored judicial “counselors” undermines faith 
in the rule of law—suggesting that law is not the ultimate touch-
stone and, instead, the views of the chosen few are controlling.97 
Of course the same critique applies with equal force to the 
Supreme Court’s current reliance on the solicitor general. Empiri-
cal studies and the justices’ own comments make clear that solici-
tor general filings are read with special care.98 Indeed, when the 
justices call for the views of the solicitor general on whether to 
grant certiorari, they typically follow her recommendation.99 
We do not think that concerns about judicial favoritism, 
standing alone, are persuasive. The solicitor general and other 
top advocates deserve the deference that comes from a history of 
top-notch briefs and oral arguments. Expertise has its rightful 
advantages. Still, we are mindful that others would find the 
anointing of the Chamber of Commerce in business cases or the 
ACLU in First Amendment cases troubling in a constitutional 
sense. If that is the case, they should be equally troubled by the 
obvious and outsized influence that the solicitor general wields 
upon the Court.100 
We find current practice problematic because it suggests no 
limiting principle, with the courts able to seek out legal advice 
                                                                                                             
2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 765218) (Miguel Estrada); Brief for Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of the Judgment below by Invitation of the Court, Setser v United States, 
No 10-7387, *1 (US filed Oct 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 4872041) 
(Evan A. Young and Aaron Streett). 
 96 See Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and 
Political Theory 34–40 (Elgar 1994). 
 97 Consider Lazarus, 96 Georgetown L J at 1521–22 (cited in note 73). 
 98 See note 73. See also Black and Owens, Solicitor General at 70–71 (cited in note 82). 
 99 See Black and Owens, Solicitor General at 58–70 (cited in note 82); Thompson 
and Wachtell, 16 Geo Mason L Rev at 275–77 (cited in note 82). 
 100 The solicitor general typically advances the policy views of the president and, 
more generally, advocates for executive branch power. 
 886  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:859 
   
from anyone. We do not think that the judicial power of Article 
III extends so far. Equally troubling is that the federal courts 
have pointed neither to Article III nor some congressional stat-
ute to justify the practice of soliciting argument; instead, they 
have simply assumed this sweeping power.101 
B.  Judicial Requests for Advice and the Federal Legal System 
Despite being a fixture of recent Supreme Court practice, 
Article III never authorizes judicial requests for legal advice 
from nonparties. The federal legal system, unlike civil law sys-
tems, is adversarial, not inquisitorial. And while the boundaries 
of what constitutes an adversarial system are subject to de-
bate,102 there is no question that “[p]arties, rather than officers 
of the state, control[ ] case preparation.”103 Indeed, “party presen-
tation is cited as the major distinction” between the federal sys-
tem and the inquisitorial systems of continental Europe.104 More 
than that, by separating the prosecutorial and adjudicatory 
functions, the adversarial system limits executive branch control 
over the judiciary and, in so doing, comports with the constitu-
tional ideal of an independent judiciary performing distinctively 
judicial acts.105 Correspondingly, the case or controversy re-
quirement mitigates the risk of the judiciary overstepping its 
bounds and performing nonjudicial functions.106 Specifically, by 
 
 101 For instance, the landmark Judges Bill of 1925 provided the Supreme Court with 
authority to decide which cases to take and, in so doing, transformed the Court from an 
institution that had no choice but to exercise judicial power to one in which the Court 
decides what legal issues it wants to address. See Judiciary Act of 1925 § 1 (“Judges Bill 
of 1925”), Pub L No 68-415, ch 229, 43 Stat 936, 937–38. For an excellent treatment of 
the tension between discretionary certiorari power and traditional judicial review, see 
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after 
the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum L Rev 1643, 1713–30 (2000). We believe that if the federal 
courts are to have the power to seek legal advice from nonparties, they must be given 
that power by Congress, for the Constitution itself never conveys such power. Yet Con-
gress has never granted such power to the federal courts. There is nothing in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence or any congressional law that authorizes federal judges to seek expert 
opinions on questions of federal law. For additional discussion, see notes 109–10 and ac-
companying text (discussing the appointment of expert witnesses). 
 102 As we discuss in Part II.C, the two competing adjudicatory models utilized by 
American courts (dispute resolution and law declaration) both recognize that the Ameri-
can system is adversarial. 
 103 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 374, 381–82 (1982).  
 104 Frost, 59 Duke L J at 449 (cited in note 15). 
 105 See Resnik, 96 Harv L Rev at 381 (cited in note 103) (arguing that the adversari-
al model’s focus on the parties is consistent with the Framers’ desire to vest significant 
judicial power in the public through juries, public trials, and limits on court power). 
 106 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1. 
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looking to adversarial parties and not state agents to present the 
facts and legal arguments, the case or controversy requirement 
“limit[s] the business of federal courts to . . . [matters] historically 
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process” and, 
in so doing, “assure[s] that the federal courts will not intrude into 
areas committed to the other branches of government.”107 
Without question, Article III’s embrace of the adversarial 
model is core to the judicial function “both in how the facts [and 
legal arguments] are presented and in which court is responsible 
for finding them.”108 Indeed, even when the federal system al-
lows for departures from a purely adversarial system, those de-
partures often highlight the dominance of that model. For ex-
ample, while federal judges are authorized to appoint expert 
witnesses (typically in cases that deal with technical issues of 
fact),109 judges rarely do so for fear that such appointments 
might “inappropriately deprive the parties of control over the 
presentation of the case.”110 
In sharp contrast, “civil-law systems give judges the leading 
role in deciding which facts need to be ascertained and bringing 
them out (thus seeking directly to determine the truth . . . ).”111 
Civil law systems use trials that involve “hearings and consulta-
tions for the presentation and consideration of evidence.”112 
While the focus of the inquisitorial model is judicial fact-finding, 
the “active role” of the judge sometimes extends to matters of 
 
 107 Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 95 (1968). 
 108 Gorod, 61 Duke L J at 25 (cited in note 15). 
 109 See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Spe-
cial Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 Minn L Rev 625, 684 
(2002) (remarking that the Federal Rule of Evidence 706 power to appoint experts is 
rarely invoked). And while there is nothing prohibiting the appointment of expert wit-
nesses to provide information on legal questions, we are unaware of any instance in 
which a federal judge appointed an expert witness to provide a legal opinion on the 
meaning of federal law. To our knowledge, the only instances in which federal courts 
have asked experts to provide information on legal questions involved foreign court in-
terpretations of foreign law (and we are aware of only a few cases in which court-
appointed experts provided information on foreign law). See Matthew J. Wilson, Demys-
tifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater 
Global Understanding, 46 Wake Forest L Rev 887, 927–30 (2011) (asserting the value of 
court-appointed foreign law experts and noting that the practice is used rarely). 
 110 Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Science 537, 538 
(1998). See also Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts: Defining 
the Role of Experts Appointed under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 4–5 (Federal Judicial 
Center 1993). 
 111 Rowe, 36 Sw U L Rev at 205 (cited in note 13).  
 112 Apple and Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System at 37 (cited in note 13). 
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law.113 In Germany, for example, the federal Constitutional 
Court can “call for specialized opinions from third parties and 
appoint experts to report on specific legal issues.”114 Against this 
backdrop, there is little question that judicial requests for non-
party legal opinions adhere to the inquisitorial model of civil law 
countries, not the adversarial model embraced by the federal 
system. The power to seek out information on questions of law 
and fact is central to the inquisitorial model (which merges ex-
ecutive and judicial functions) and alien to the American model 
(which vests substantial power in the hands of the adversaries 
specifically to ensure the separation of the executive and judicial 
functions).115 
Judicial requests for nonparty legal opinions are alien to the 
federal courts for a second, related reason. Such requests for le-
gal advice have the look and feel of a legislative, not a judicial, 
act. These requests mirror what congressional committees do 
through hearings and have little connection to an adversarial 
system in which parties and amici submit facts and legal argu-
ments to courts. More to the point, while federal courts adjudi-
cate particular “cases or controversies,” legislatures exercise a 
general jurisdiction and can act affirmatively in assessing issues 
of facts and law. Given their sweeping authority, legislative 
committees are not confined by party pleadings or filings and 
can subpoena any and all witnesses who may assist Congress in 
sorting out the relevant facts and law.116 By way of contrast (and 
reflecting fundamental differences between courts and legisla-
tures under the American system), courts cannot call witnesses, 
must adhere to rules against ex parte communications, and 
must decide a particular case at a particular moment in time.117 
 
 113 John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev 
823, 843 n 71 (1985). 
 114 Peter L. Murray and Rolf Stürner, German Civil Justice 416 (Carolina Academic 
2004). 
 115 See Resnik, 96 Harv L Rev at 380–82 (cited in note 103). 
 116 For an overview of the structural differences between courts and legislatures, 
including an assessment of whether Congress is better equipped than federal courts to 
gather and assess information, see Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the 
Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 Duke L J 1169, 1177–87 (2001). See 
also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U Chi L Rev 933, 
937–63 (2006) (highlighting strengths and weaknesses of legislative and judicial decision 
making). 
 117 For this very reason, judicial minimalists argue that the Supreme Court should 
recognize the judiciary’s institutional limits by issuing “narrow” and “shallow” decisions. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
10–14 (Harvard 1999). See also Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and 
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And while courts may consult amicus briefs and conduct their 
own research (now fueled by the Internet),118 the American sys-
tem never anticipates that courts will seek legal opinions from 
nonparties because Article III never authorizes as much.119 
We can think of but one exception, an exception that com-
ports with Article III’s commitment to the adversarial model.120 
The power of courts to “say what the law is” includes the power 
to ask the parties to a dispute to argue legal issues that the 
courts identify as relevant. When one or both parties are unwill-
ing to make such arguments, a court may request amici to file 
briefs. In such circumstances, appointment of amici (a request 
for legal advice) helps ensure an adversarial presentation of all 
legal issues the court deems pertinent. When both sides to a le-
gal dispute are willing to make arguments on all relevant legal 
issues, however, a court’s solicitation of legal arguments trans-
cends the bounds of federal judicial power. In these circum-
stances the court has no need for outsiders to present legal opin-
ions to the court because the parties themselves fulfill that 
function. If the power to request opinions in these circumstances 
is tied to the perceived need for the court to hear both sides of an 
argument, as we believe it is, then there can be no power to re-
quest opinions when both sides to a case are ready, willing, and 
able to make their own arguments. In other words, when the 
parties are adversarial on all relevant points of law, the courts 
cannot solicit legal advice from nonparties in order to provide 
more or better adversarialness. 
                                                                                                             
Institutions, 101 Mich L Rev 885, 948–50 (2003) (arguing that debates over legal interpre-
tation should be informed by assessments of the judiciary’s institutional capacity). 
 118 For a critical assessment of the Supreme Court’s use of Google searches, see 
Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1295–301 (cited in note 16). For a critical assessment of the Su-
preme Court’s use of amicus briefs, see Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman 
Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 Tex L Rev 1247, 1267–70 (2011). 
 119 In making this claim, we recognize that judicial adjuncts—most notably special 
masters—sometimes call nonparty witnesses in their fact-finding efforts. See Carstens, 
86 Minn L Rev at 653–54 (cited in note 109); James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Pow-
ers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 NYU L Rev 800, 
820–28 (1991). Whether this practice is fundamentally at odds with the adversarial pro-
cess, we are unaware of any instance in which a special master requested legal opinions 
from nonparty witnesses. 
 120 See notes 134–37 and accompanying text.  
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C.  Law Declaration, Dispute Resolution, and Requests for 
Advice 
By generally leaving it to parties and not the state to frame 
legal disputes, the adversarial model insulates the courts from 
other parts of the government.121 At the same time, party control 
sometimes constrains the judiciary’s ability to “say what the law 
is.” Parties may fail to raise issues germane to the resolution of 
disputes and may be unwilling to pursue some legal arguments 
that would support their side of the case.122 For some scholars 
(and increasingly the Supreme Court), the judiciary’s responsi-
bility to “say what the law is” sometimes trumps party control of 
the dispute. Others reject the law declaration model, urging the 
courts to adhere to the “formally dominant” dispute resolution 
model.123 
We take no side in this dispute. Requests for legal advice 
have no place in either the law declaration or dispute resolution 
model when both parties to a legal dispute stand willing to ar-
gue all relevant legal issues (including those issues raised by the 
presiding court). Again, there may be a place for court-appointed 
amici when either party abandons or fails to pursue relevant le-
gal arguments. But our analysis suggests that the Court should 
not otherwise solicit the views of nonparties, including the solici-
tor general, Congress, or members of the Supreme Court Bar.124 
Under the dispute resolution model, courts exist to “settle 
disputes” between parties and, consequently, should look solely 
to the law and facts submitted by the parties.125 Corresponding-
ly, “[i]f the parties agree on a proposition, that proposition simp-
ly is not in dispute” and a court should neither raise issues sua 
sponte nor enlist amici to make legal arguments that one or the 
other party is unwilling to make.126 Needless to say, under this 
model courts cannot order or solicit nonparty legal opinions. 
 
 121 See text accompanying notes 105–07. 
 122 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 467–69 (cited in note 15); Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L 
Rev at 939–50 (cited in note 16); Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the 
Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U Pa L Rev 
251, 258–69 (2000).  
 123 Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 15) (explaining that, while 
the dispute resolution model is “formally dominant,” the Supreme Court increasingly 
adheres to the law declaration model). For leading articles defending these two models, 
see note 15.  
 124 See notes 78–88 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s practice 
of CVSG in around two dozen cases per year).  
 125 Lawson, 109 Mich L Rev at 1218 (cited in note 15). 
 126 Id at 1219. 
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The law declaration model emphasizes that adjudication is 
about “articulating public norms as well as settling private dis-
putes”127 and, relatedly, that “judges serve a dual role: they must 
resolve the concrete disputes before them, and . . . are also ex-
pected to make accurate statements about the meaning of the 
law that govern beyond the parameters of the parties and their 
dispute.”128 Litigants therefore do not control the record; judges 
can turn to amicus briefs and do independent research to sup-
plement litigant filings.129 Litigants, moreover, cannot dictate 
what issues or interpretive methodologies courts will use. For 
example, it is for the courts, not the litigants, to determine 
whether a court should invoke the avoidance canon.130 Likewise, 
litigants cannot disregard a potentially controlling statute and 
compel a constitutional ruling when a case might be resolved on 
statutory grounds.131 Furthermore, if the Supreme Court wants 
to revisit the continuing validity of its free speech, federalism, or 
choice of law doctrine, litigants cannot stop the Court.132 In all 
these ways, the law declaration model speaks to the power of 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, to have both “the final say 
on any constitutional issue appropriate for judicial resolution” 
and “maximum freedom in agenda setting, quite irrespective of 
the litigants’ wishes.”133 
 
 127 Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy 
between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 BU L Rev 1273, 
1275 (1995). 
 128 Frost, 59 Duke L J at 452 (cited in note 15). 
 129 See Gorod, 61 Duke L J at 25–37 (cited in note 15) (discussing extra-record fact 
finding and a potential tension between the Supreme Court’s use of amicus briefs and 
the adversarial model); Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1257–58 (cited in note 16) (discussing the 
modern Court’s use of internet searches to supplement party and amicus briefs). 
 130 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 719 (cited in note 15), citing Frost, 59 Duke 
L J at 510 (cited in note 15). 
 131 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 509–11 (cited in note 15); Devins, 149 U Pa L Rev at 
279–84 (cited in note 122). 
 132 See Devins, 149 U Pa L Rev at 261–62 (cited in note 122) (discussing the Court’s 
reconsideration of the federal common law doctrine in Erie notwithstanding party efforts 
to preserve the then-existing doctrine of Swift v Tyson), citing Erie Railroad Co v Tomp-
kins, 304 US 64 (1938) and Swift v Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842). Other instances in 
which the Court called for supplemental briefing to consider overruling existing doctrine 
include Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 536, 546–47 
(1985) (holding that states cannot claim immunity from federal regulations based on 
“traditional” governmental functions), and Citizens United v Federal Election Commis-
sion, 130 S Ct 876, 893 (2010) (ruling against the federal government with respect to po-
litical freedom of speech for corporations).  
 133 Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 722 (cited in note 15). 
 892  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:859 
   
Yet even as the law declaration model limits litigant control 
in framing and presenting cases, it does not disavow or upend 
the “American adversarial legal system,” including the central 
idea that—unlike the inquisitorial model—“parties [typically] 
present the facts and legal arguments to an impartial and pas-
sive decisionmaker.”134 “Allowing judges to raise issues is not 
equivalent to transforming the judge into an advocate for one 
side or the other,” for both parties are given an opportunity to 
address the issues.135 And if one of the parties is unwilling to 
pursue a court-identified issue, the court may appoint an amicus 
to ensure an adversarial presentation of all issues deemed rele-
vant by the court.136 In other words, the law declaration model 
limits party control in ways that facilitate adversarial presenta-
tions of all legal issues deemed relevant by a court. Consequent-
ly, as we noted earlier, when both parties to a dispute stand 
ready to address all legal issues identified by a court, the law 
declaration model does not suggest that the courts may order or 
request supplemental legal filings.137 
Put another way, while it is possible that particular adher-
ents of the law declaration model may believe that the federal 
courts should have the power to request legal opinions from 
nonparties, any such belief does not follow from the principles 
that underlie the law declaration model. After all, the law decla-
ration model does not suppose that the courts must have any 
and all resources that facilitate judicial declaration of what the 
law is. For example, we do not know of any adherents of the law 
declaration model who believe that courts have a constitutional 
right to law clerks or a limited docket, both of which would be 
extremely useful in correctly declaring the law. Nor do we be-
lieve that proponents of the law declaration model think that the 
courts can offer bounties to induce the filing of lawsuits that 
then enable courts to expound on the meaning of the law.  The 
law declaration model does not countenance an unyielding and 
uncompromising commitment to whatever would conduce judi-
cial interpretations. 
 
 134 Frost, 59 Duke L J at 449 (cited in note 15).  
 135 Id at 501. 
 136 See id. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 
939–50 (cited in note 16) (considering the circumstances where court appointment of 
amicus is consistent with the underlying goals of the adversarial system). 
 137 In making this point, we express no opinion on whether the law declaration mod-
el extends to CVSGs and the decision to grant certiorari or, instead, is limited to those 
cases that the Court will decide.  
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CONCLUSION 
We think it clear that the federal courts lack constitutional 
authority to demand legal opinions from others, governmental 
actors or otherwise. The Constitution generally spells out when 
one branch owes a duty to supply advice to others. Yet there is 
no power granted to federal judges to demand opinions of other 
branches. Relatedly, neither of the political branches has any 
constitutional duty to comply with any demands for legal opin-
ions that the federal courts might make. More generally, the 
federal judicial power is a power to decide cases. While that 
power includes authority over court proceedings—to compel the 
production of evidence and to control admission to practice—it 
does not encompass the different power to compel the production 
of legal advice. Indeed, we believe that the federal courts even 
lack the power to compel the parties to a case to supply legal ad-
vice. The parties are free to ignore judicial demands for legal  
argumentation. 
We also believe that federal courts generally may not re-
quest legal advice from nonparties. Federal courts are neither 
congressional committees nor civil law inquisitorial tribunals, 
both of which have free reign to seek legal advice. The only time 
that federal courts may request legal advice is when one or both 
parties to a dispute refuse to supply legal arguments regarding 
an issue the court deems relevant. Under these circumstances, 
the law declaration model suggests that the courts may request 
the legal advice of third parties. In no other circumstances do ei-
ther the law declaration or dispute resolution models suggest 
that the courts have power to request legal advice. 
Our critique of federal judicial requests for legal advice 
means that CVSGs are beyond the scope of the judicial power 
conveyed by Article III. Put another way, unless and until Con-
gress authorizes such requests, CVSGs are unconstitutional.138 
While CVSGs are a staple of recent practice, no one, not even the 
Supreme Court, has ever explained the source of the authority to 
request the legal opinions of nonparties. We are confident that 
when one begins that much belated inquiry, one will conclude 
 
 138 For identical reasons, the Supreme Court could not claim inherent power to con-
trol its docket through grants of certiorari. That power came through the Judges Bill of 
1925. See note 101. 
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that the federal courts lack the power to seek legal advice from 
any and all.139 
At a minimum, judicial orders and requests for legal advice 
require justification of the sort that the courts have never of-
fered.140 Rather than assume a general, roving power to demand 
or request nonparty legal opinions, federal courts should justify 
such demands and requests by reference to Article III or some 
statute. Instead, courts, especially the Supreme Court, assume 
that they can give “homework assignments” to the DOJ and oth-
ers. This judicial hubris stems from the Supreme Court’s eager-
ness to declare legal principles rather than merely to resolve 
disputes. Our Essay will be a success if it spurs courts and 
scholars to examine and justify this unexplored feature of feder-
al court (especially Supreme Court) practice. 
 
 139 We speak here of legal advice on questions of federal law. As noted earlier, the 
issue of federal court certification of state law issues to state courts is beyond the scope 
of this Essay. See note 12. 
 140 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 680–83 (cited in note 15) (noting the failure 
of courts to formally articulate a theory defending its increasing embrace of the law dec-
laration model). 
